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I. INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court's recent decision in Diamond v. Diehr'
culminated over a decade 2 of litigation on the patentability 3 of programming. 4 Diehr, post-Diehr decisions, and new U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO) guidelines on the patentability of programming have significantly clarified the types of programming
which may be patented. The post-Diehr decisions provide a consistent body of law for assessing the patentability of inventions involving programming. The new USPTO guidelines provide a
significantly broader scope of patent protection for programming
than that which was previously afforded by the courts.
Programming has traditionally been protected through the
mechanisms of copyright or trade secrets. 5 However, both mechanisms have had recognized deficiencies in providing effective protection for the underlying logic used for coding the program, known as
the algorithm. The recent changes in the law and the USPTO's will1. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
2. In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1378 (C.C.P.A. 1968), petitionfor reh'g granted, 415 F.2d
1390 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (first significant case which addressed eligibility of inventions involving computer programming for patent protection).
3. The eligibility of inventions for patent protection arises under 35 U.S.C. § 101
(1976). Section 101 of the Patent Code defines the subject matter which is eligible for
patent protection: "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture or composition of matter or any new and useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of
this title." In this Article, "patentability of programming" or "patentable subject matter" will be used as a shorthand notation for identifying this issue.
4. "Programming" as used in this Article refers to the process of formulating an
algorithm and a series of steps in a computer language to solve a problem. The problem to be solved may be either scientific or nonscientific in nature. The medium of
expression of the resultant program may be in software or in hardware, such as a
read-only memory (ROM).
5. Trade secret protection of programming typically imposes conditions of confidentiality between the buyer and seller, the lessor and lessee, or the employer and
employees. Generally, a breach in confidentiality must be shown in order to obtain
trade secret relief.
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ingness to consider programming as patentable subject matter provide a third mechanism for protecting many types of programming.
In many instances, combinations of patent, copyright and trade secret protection may now be used to protect programming more effectively than any single mechanism previously used.

II. PATENT PROTECTION
A.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Prior to the decision in Diehr 6, the law on the patentability of
programming was constantly changing and was so unpredictable
that the patent law was seldom used to protect programming even
though the potential dollar loss was enormous. 7 The principal forums for the development of the law on the patentability of programming were the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO), the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA), 8 and
the United States Supreme Court.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Gottschalk v. Benson,9
the CCPA rejected the USPTO's reliance on the "mental steps doctrine" as a basis for refusing to consider programming patentable
subject matter and substituted its own expansive "technological
arts" standard.' 0 Under the mental steps doctrine, inventions which
required human thought in whole or in part for their practice were
judicially considered not to be patentable subject matter. The doctrine had its origin in attempts to patent technologies much older
than digital computing. With the doctrine in mind, the USPTO argued that claim recitations" such as "determining," "registering,"
6. See Blumenthal & Riter, Statutory or Non-Statutory?: An Analysis of the Patentability of Computer Related Inventions, 62 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y, No. 8, 454-520 (1981)
for a detailed review of pre-Diehr decisions on the patentability of programming.
7. In Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 587 n.7 (1978), an estimate of the value of
software in use in the United States in 1976 was stated to be $43.1 billion with the
projection of $70.7 billion by 1980.
8. On October 1, 1982, the CCPA became the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit (CAFC) with appellate jurisdiction, inter alia, over all patent appeals from
the United States Patent and Trademark Office and the federal district courts. The
court will play a significant role in the continued development of all facets of the patent law on programming.
9. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
10. See infra text accompanying notes 30-34.
11. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1976) requires, inter alia, that the claims particularly point
out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention. The claims of a patent define the scope of the subject matter covered by the
patent upon which the patentee's right of exclusion is based. All of the precedent
discussed infra is concerned with the scope of the claimed subject matter. What appear to be small differences in the scope of the claims can be the basis for subject
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"counting," "observing," and "measuring" 12 were not subject matter
eligible for patent protection because the claimed acts were capable
13
of being performed by humans.
The USPTO used the mental steps doctrine as its first line of defense in refusing to grant patents on inventions involving computer
programming. In large part, USPTO resistance to granting patents
on programming stemmed from its admittedly inadequate resources 14 to examine patents involving programming for compliance
with the statutory criteria of novelty 15 and unobviousness 16 which
all patentable inventions must satisfy. Even today the USPTO does
not have a large body of "reference" programming which enables it
to determine adequately if an application is novel and unobvious independent of information provided by a patent applicant.
In the Prater opinion, the CCPA stated its rationale why programs are patentable subject matter. "No reason is now apparent to
us why, based on the Constitution, statute or case law, apparatus
and process claims broad enough to encompass the operation of a
programmed general-purpose digital computer are necessarily unpatentable."'1 7 The court's reasoning provided the foundation for the
technological arts standard developed in subsequent cases.
In Musgrave, the CCPA defined this new test for determining
whether or not a computer was patentable subject matter in terms
of whether the claimed invention related to the "technological
arts." 8 The new "technological arts" test was intended to expand
the scope of patentable subject matter defined by 35 U.S.C. section
101 to the constitutional limit of promoting progress in the sciences
matter being characterized as either patentable or unpatentable under § 101. Compare Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978) (method of updating alarm limits during catalytic conversion process held not patentable under § 101) with Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981)
(process for molding raw, synthetic rubber into cured precision products held eligible
for patent protection under § 101).
12. See In re Abrams, 188 F.2d 165 (C.C.PA. 1951); see also Halliburton Oil Well
Cementing Co. v. Walker, 64 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 278 (1944).
13. See In re Waldbaum, 457 F.2d 997 (C.C.PA 1972); In re Foster, 438 F.2d 1011
(C.C.P.A. 1971); In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882 (C.C.PA 1970).
14. The 1966 report of the President's Commission of the Patent System stated:
The Patent Office now cannot examine applications for programs because of
a lack of a classification technique and the requisite search files. Even if
these were available, reliable searches would not be feasible or economic because of the tremendous volume of prior art being generated. Without this
search, the patenting of programs would be tantamount to mere registration
and the presumption of validity would be all but nonexistent.
15. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1976).
16. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976).
17. 415 U.S. at 1403 n.29 (emphasis in original).
18. 431 F.2d at 893.
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and useful arts. Judge Rich stated in his concurring opinion in In re
Waldbaum:
The phrase "useful arts" which was written into the Constitution
conjures up images of the Franklin stove, horse collars, and buggy
whips. The term "technological arts" was selected in Musgrave as
probably having a connotation in these times roughly equivalent to
that which "useful arts" had in the eighteenth century. No new legal concept was intended. In fact in Musgrave it was coupled with
reference to the "useful arts" provision in the Constitution. Again
in In re Benson,. . . when the same test was applied, the question
asked was whether the process was not "in the technological or
useful arts." Now we have come full circle in pointing out that the
intention all along has been to convey the same idea and to occupy
whatever ground the Constitution permits with respect to the categories of patentable subject matter named in section 101.19
B.

PRE-DIEHR DECISIONS

1. Gottschalk v. Benson
The Supreme Court's decision in Gottschalk v. Benson 20 was a
strong repudiation of the CCPA's technological arts test. The Benson patent application disclosed a method for converting binary
coded decimal (BCD) numerals into binary numerals. The
Supreme Court described the method sought to be patented as
varying
the ordinary arithmatic steps a human would use by changing the
order of the steps, changing the symbolism for writing the multiplier used in some steps and by taking subtotals after each successive operation. The mathematical procedures can be carried out in
existing computers long in use, no new machinery being necessary.
21
And, as noted they can also be performed without a computer.
The process claim before the Supreme Court read:
A data processing method for converting binary coded decimal
number representations into binary number representations comprising the steps of
19. 457 F.2d 997 (C.C.P.A. 1972) (citations omitted).
20. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
21. 409 U.S. at 67 (emphasis added). In their respective decisions in Benson, the
CCPA and the Supreme Court disagreed on the subject matter covered by the claims.
Judge Rich of the CCPA found that the recitation of a reentrant shift register in claim
8 precluded any application other than a machine with a "reentrant shift register."
Likewise, claim 13 was concluded to have "no practical use other than the more efficient operation and utilization of a machine known as a digital computer." Thus
claims 8 and 13 were held by the CCPA to be patentable subject matter for the reason
that they covered a machine or a machine performed process. See In re Benson, 441
F.2d 682 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
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(1) testing each binary digit position '1' beginning with the
least significant binary digit position, of the most significant decimal
digit representation for a binary '0' or a binary '1';
(2) if a binary '0' is detected, repeating step (1) for the next
least significant binary digit position of said most significant decimal digit representation;
(3) if a binary '1' is detected, adding a binary '1' at the (i +
1)th and (i + 3)th least significant binary digit positions of the next
lesser significant decimal digit representation, and repeating step
(1) for the next least significant binary digit position of said most
significant decimal digit representation;
(4) upon exhausting the binary digit positions of said most
significant decimal digit representation, repeating steps (1) through
(3) for the next lesser significant decimal digit representation as
modified by the previous execution of steps (1) through (3); and
(5) repeating steps (1) through (4) until the second least sig22
nificant decimal digit representation has been so processed.
The Court was clearly troubled by the breadth of the process
claim which in its view covered both known and unknown uses of
the algorithm and thus effectively covered the algorithm itself.
Here the "process" claim is so abstract and sweeping as to cover
both known and unknown uses of the BCD to pure binary conversion. The end use may (1) vary from the operation of a train to verification of drivers' licenses to researching the law books for
precedents and (2) be performed through any existing machinery
23
or future-devised machinery or without any apparatus.
Moreover, the Court's reference to '"pure binary conversion" had a
connotation similar to the mental steps doctrine which had been
previously replaced by the CCPA's technological arts test as the basis for determining the patentability of programming.
The Supreme Court characterized its holding "in a nutshell":
It is conceded that one may not patent an idea. But in practical effect that would be the result if the formula for converting BCD
numerals to pure binary numerals were patented in this case. The
mathematical formula involved here has no substantial practical application except in connection with a digital computer, which means
that ifthe judgment below is affirmed, the patent would wholly preempt the mathematicalformula and in practical effect would be a
24
patent on the algorithm itself
The "nutshell" holding of Benson, which proscribed preemption of
22. 409 U.S. at 74.
23. Id. at 68 (emphasis added). The Benson Court stated an algorithm to be "[a I
procedure for solving a given type of mathematical problem." 409 U.S. at 65. This definition has been adopted in later decisions of the Supreme Court and the CCPA.
24. Id. at 71-72 (emphasis added).
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mathematical formulas, is today a keystone part of the test for determining the patentability of programming.
2.

In re Christensen

The CCPA extended the limited holding 25 of Benson in Christensen.26 In Christensen, the invention sought to be patented was of a
method for determining porosity of a subsurface formation 2 7 involving the solution of a novel equation on a digital computer limited to
geological applications. The claimed invention recited antecedent
data gathering steps in conjunction with the solution of a mathematical algorithm. The CCPA held that the recitation of the antecedent
data gathering steps necessary for performing a method of calculation would not convert an unpatentable method of calculation into
patentable subject matter.
The issue before us in the instant case is also a narrow one, namely,
is a method claim in which the point of novelty is a mathematical
equation to be solved as the final step of the method, a statutory
method? We follow the Supreme Court [in Benson] in concluding
that the answer is in the negative. Given that the method of solving
a mathematical equation may not be the subject of patent protection, it follows that the addition of the old and necessary antecedent
steps of establishing values for the variable in the equation cannot
28
convert the unpatentable method to patentable subject matter.
3.

In re Richman

In Richman,29 the CCPA extended Christensen to hold that even
the presence of novel and unobvious antecedent data gathering
steps would not convert an otherwise unpatentable method of calculation involving a mathematical algorithm into patentable subject
matter. Under Richman, all inventions which were properly
characterizable as "methods of calculation" (algorithms as used in
Benson) were unpatentable subject matter. In effect, the patentability of programming had evolved into an inquiry of the identity of the
invention described in the patent specification, with applicationsof
methods of calculation which involved more than antecedent data
25. In Dann v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 219 (1976), Justice Marshall characterized the
Benson holding: "Our limited holding. . . was that respondent's method was not a
patentable 'process' as that term is defined in 35 U.S.C. § 100(b)." Id. at 224.
26. In re Christensen, 478 F.2d 1392 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
27. The application disclosed that the porosity of subsurface formations is one of
the parameters which are useful to geologists, petroleum engineers and others interested in analyzing lithologic formations.
28. 478 F.2d at 1394.
29. In re Richman, 563 F.2d 1026 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
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gathering steps or limitations to particular fields of use, being patentable subject matter.
4.

Other Decisions

Outside of the area of patent applications having claims to
methods of calculation, the CCPA had little trouble construing Ben30
son narrowly to find patentable subject matter. In In re Johnson,
31
3
2
33
In re N6il, In re Chatfield, and In re Deutsch, the CCPA found
the subject matter patentable because the claimed inventions involved subject matter not limited to methods of calculation for solving mathematical equations. In substance, the inventions in these
cases were found to involve applications in the technological arts.
The USPTO was distressed that the CCPA was narrowly construing
the Benson decision.3 The USPTO believed the CCPA was finding
patentable subject matter in patent applications which were clearly
unpatentable under its perception of the Benson decision.
5.

Parker v. Flook

In Parker v. Flook,35 the Supreme Court addressed the issue of
patentability of a method for updating alarm limits. An alarm limit
was disclosed in the patent application as a parameter in a catalytic
hydrocarbon conversion process. The broadest claim was:
1. A method for updating the value of at least one alarm limit on at
least one process variable involved in a process comprising the catalytic chemical conversion of hydrocarbons wherein said alarm
limit has a current value of
Bo + K
wherein Bo is the current alarm base and K is a predetermined
alarm offset which comprises:
(1) Determining the present value of said process variable, said
present value being defined as PVL;
(2) Determining a new alarm base B1 using the following
equation:
B 1 = Bo(1.0 - F) + PVL(F)
where F is a predetermined number greater than zero and less than
1.0;
(3) Determining an updated alarm limit value which is defined as
30. In re Johnson, 502 F.2d 765 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
31. In re Noll, 545 F.2d 141 (C.C.P-A. 1976).
32. In re Chatfield, 545 F.2d 152 (C.C.P.A. 1976).
33. In re Deutsch, 553 F.2d 689 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
34. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 202 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ('The Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals in subsequent cases began to narrow its interpretation
of Benson.").
35. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
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B1 + K, and, thereafter
36
(4) Adjusting said alarm limit to said updated alarm limit value.
The Supreme Court held that Flook's method was not patentable subject matter.
Respondent's process is unpatentable under § 101 not because it
contains a mathematical algorithm as one component but because
once that algorithm is assumed to be within the prior art,the application, considered as a whole, contains no patentable invention.
Even though a phenomenon of nature or mathematical formula
may be well known, an inventive application of the principle may
be patented. Conversely, the discovery of such a phenomenon cannot support a patent unless there is some other inventive concept
in its application.
Here it is absolutely clear that respondent's application contains no claim of patentable invention. The chemical processes involved in catalytic conversion of hydrocarbons are well known, as
are the practice of monitoring the chemical process variables, the
use of alarm limits to trigger alarms the notion that alarm limit values must be recomputed and readjusted, and the use of computers
for "automatic process monitoring-alarming." Respondent's application simply provides a new and presumably better method for
calculating alarm limit values. If we assume that the method was
also known as we must under the reasoning in Morse, then respondent's claim is, in effect, comparable to a claim that the formula 2ir
can be usefully applied in determining the circumference of a
wheel. As the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals has explained,
"if a claim is directed essentially to a method of calculating,using a
mathematicalformula even if the solution is for a specific purpose,
the claimed method is nonstatutory."37
The factual basis for the Supreme Court's holding was its perception that the claimed invention was essentially a method of calculation for a specific purpose. The Court rejected Flook's argument
that "the presence of special 'post-solution' activity-the adjustment
of the alarm limit to the figure computed according to the formuladistinguishes this case from Benson and makes his process
' 38
patentable.
The Supreme Court viewed the alarm limit recited in the claims
as a pure number which was divorced from an application to specific technology:
The patent application does not purport to explain how to select the
appropriate margin of safety, the weighting factor, or any of the
other variables. Nor does it purport to contain any disclosure relat36. Id. at 596-97.

37. Id. at 594-95 (emphasis added).
38. Id. at 590.
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ing to the chemical processes at work, the monitoring of process
variables, or the means of setting off an alarm or adjusting an alarm
system. All that
it provides is a formula for computing an updated
39
alarm limit."

Viewing Fook's disclosures as being deficient in teaching specific applications of alarm limits, the Supreme Court found Benson
controlling in Flook-the only difference being the presence of postsolution activity in Flook which in Richman was held not to make
an invention involving programming patentable subject matter. In a
footnote the Supreme Court characterized its holding: "Very simply, our holding today is that a claim for an improved method of calculation, even when tied to a specific end use, is unpatentable
subject matter under § 101." 40 The Supreme Court's test in Flook
"that [the] algorithm is assumed to be within the prior art" provided
a basis for the USPTO to find most forms of programming unpatentable subject matter and was soundly criticized as mixing considerations of novelty and obviousness with considerations of statutory
41
subject matter.
6.

In re Freeman and In re Walter

In response to the Benson and Flook cases, the CCPA developed a two-part test for determining patentability of programming.
The two-part test was based upon the holding in Benson that claims
which "preempt" methods of calculation involving mathematical algorithms are not patentable subject matter. In In re Freeman,42 the
invention sought to be patented was a computer controlled phototypesetting machine. The hardware was of conventional design but
the computer control program produced a machine which was undisputedly new and obvious. The USPTO argued in Freeman that
the fact that the only disclosed novelty in the specification was the
program precluded a finding of patentable subject matter. The
CCPA's test required (1) determination whether the claimed invention directly or indirectly recites an algorithm and (2) that if an algorithm is found, it must be determined whether the claim wholly
preempts the algorithm, that is, whether preemption precludes patentable subject matter. Application of the two-part test in Freeman
resulted in reversal of the USPTO rejection.
39. Id. at 586.
40. Id. at 595 n.18.
41. See Blumenthal & Riter, supra note 6, at 487: "It is unfortunate that the
Supreme Court analysis dictates placing the mathematical algorithm in the 'prior art.'
The term 'prior art' imports a novelty/obviousness question into the picture and
tends to confuse issues."
42. In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
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In response to the Flook Court's holding that methods of calculation applied to find particular end uses (trivial post-solution) were
not patentable subject matter, the CCPA modified its Freeman test
in In re Walter 43 to not require preemption of the algorithm to find
unpatentable subject matter.
Once a mathematical algorithm has been found, the claim as a
whole must be further analyzed. If it appears that the mathematical algorithm is implemented in a specific manner to define structural relationships between the physical elements of the claim (in
apparatus claims) or to refine or limit claim steps (in process
claims), the claim being otherwise statutory, the claim passes muster under § 101. If, however, the mathematical algorithm is merely
presented and solved by the claimed invention, as was the case in
Benson and Flook, and is not applied in any manner to physical elements or process steps, no amount of post-solution activity will
render the claim statutory: nor is it saved by a preamble merely reciting the field of use of the mathematical algorithm. 44
In Walter, the CCPA sustained the USPTO rejection that the
claimed signals were not limited to physical quantities:
Claim 12, and claims 10 and 11 dependent therefrom, are not
presented in Jepson format, but they suffer from a fundamental
flaw which places them outside the bounds of § 101. These claims
are directed to the process of cross-correlationin the abstract. They
are not limited to any particular art or technology, unless pure
mathematics is considered as an art or technology. The "signals"
processed by the inventions of claims 10-12 may represent either
physical quantities or abstract quantities; the claims do not require
one or the other. The claims thus dominate the particular method
of cross-correlation in any and all arts. They are classic examples of
an attempt to embrace the algorithm or scientific truth itself rather
than a particularapplication.45
The Freeman-Walter test defined the metes and bounds of the
patentability of programming in terms of whether the claims implemented the mathematical algorithm either in structural relationships between the physical elements or the refining or limiting of
process steps. Any claim which recited a mathematical algorithm as
an "implementation" in structural relationships or process steps
was patentable subject matter. Any claim which did not implement
the algorithm, such as a method of calculation, was not patentable
subject matter.
The USPTO viewed the Freeman-Walter test as erroneous in
view of the Flook decision. The statements in Flook that (1) the al43. In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758 (C.C.PA. 1980).
44. Id. at 767.
45. Id. at 770 (emphasis added).
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gorithm is to be assumed in the prior art, and that (2) there is no
patentable subject matter "unless there is some other inventive con'
cept in its application,"4
was read by the USPTO as a broad test
which precluded patentability for most types of programming-a position consistent with its long standing resistance to the patenting of
programming.
The CCPA's Freeman-Walter test was broadly expansive of the
forms of programming which were patentable subject matter. All
forms of programming were patentable subject matter except methods of calculation (1) involving mathematical algorithms including
those limited to particular fields of use; (2) involving mathematical
algorithms in conjunction with trivial post solution activity; or
(3) involving mathematical algorithms in conjunction with the gathering of necessary data to perform the solution. On the other hand,
the USPTO test, which was based upon its reading of Flook, was totally centered on the nonalgorithmical parts of the claimed invention, which were required to be novel and unobvious
implementations of the mathematical algorithm to be patentable
subject matter. The stage for collision of these diverse viewpoints
on the patentability of programming was thus set for judicial resolution in Diehr.
C.

THE DIEHR DECISION

The invention at issue in Diehr was a computer-controlled process for curing rubber. The curing of rubber in accordance with the
Diehr invention involved the precision heating of rubber in a heating mold for an optimum curing time which was calculated by a
programmed digital computer in accordance with the knoum Arrhenius equation. 47 Variations in mold temperature were continually
monitored by a thermocouple to provide real time information of
mold performance to update calculation of the optimum mold cure
time. The mold was opened when the actual elapsed curing time
46X 437 U.S. at 594-95.
47. In a footnote the Supreme Court described the Arrhenius equation as follows:
The equation is named after its discoverer Svante Arrhenius and has long
been used to calculate the cure time in rubber molding presses. The equation can be expresses [sic] as follows:
V = CZ + X

Wherein ln v is the natural logarithm of v, the total required cure time; C is
the activation constant, a unique figure for each batch of each compound being molded, determined in accordance with rheometer measurements of each
batch; Z is the temperature in the mold, and x is a constant dependent on the
geometry of the particular mold in the press. A rheometer is an instrument
to measure flow of viscous substances.
450 U.S. at 177 n.2.
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matched the calculated optimum cure time. 48
The USPTO viewed Diehr as a perfect vehicle to reaffirm the
Flook holding and to obtain reversal of the CCPA's narrow Freeman
test. The broadest claim of the invention sought to be patented in
Diehr was:
1. A method of operating a rubber-molding press for precision
molded compounds with the aid of a digital computer, comprising:
providing said computer with a data base for said press including at least,
natural logarithm conversion data (In),
the activation energy constant (C) unique to each batch of said
component being molded, and
a constant (x) dependent upon the geometry of the particular
mold of the press,
initiating an interval timer in said computer upon the closure of
the press for monitoring the elapsed time of said closure,
constantly determining the temperature (Z) of the mold at a location closely adjacent to the mold cavity in the press during
molding,
constantly providing the computer with the temperature (Z),
repetitively calculating in the computer, at frequent intervals
during each cure, the Arrhenius equation for reaction time during
the cure, which is
Inv = CZ + x
where v is the total required cure time, repetitively comparing in
the computer at said frequent intervals during the cure each said
calculation of the total required cure time calculated with the Arrhenius equation and said elapsed time, and
opening the press automatically when a said comparison indi49
cated equivalence.
Application of the Walter test dictated that Diehr's invention
was patentable subject matter because there was no preemption of
the Arrhenius equation. As a whole, the claimed invention was an
application of a method of calculation involving a mathematical algorithm. The manifestation of the application of the algorithm was
found in a number of the claimed steps, such as "providing," "constantly determining," "constantly providing," and "opening the
press," which were not part of the calculation of the Arrhenius equation. Application of the Flook test by the court, however, dictated
48. The government did not dispute the applicant's statement that previous rubber curing processes were inadequate. See id. at 178 n.4. In patent infringement litigation, the government's failure to challenge the applicant's assertion that the
invention solved an industry-wide problem would be a serious disadvantage in proving that a patent was invalid.
49. Id. at 179 n.5.
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that the claimed process was not patentable subject matter. In
Diehr, no serious challenge was made to the USPTO Examiner's assertion that "the remaining steps-installing rubber in the press and
the subsequent closing of the press-were 'conventional' and neces50
sary to the process and cannot be the basis for patentability."
Thus, once the focus shifted to the nonalgorithmic steps, which were
admitted to be old, a finding of unpatentable subject matter under
Flook was bound to follow.
In the USPTO's view, the only difference between Diehr and
Flook was the antiquity of the Arrhenius equation in Diehr compared to the novelty of Flook's algorithm. Thus, given the facts in
Diehr, the USPTO reasoned that the Supreme Court would necessarily reaffirm Flook. The USPTO did not forsee any arguments
which would warrant a finding of patentable subject matter under
the Flook test.
The Diehr holding sub silentio5 l reversed Flook and fundamentally changed the patentability of programming. Stated broadly, the
Diehr holding was that applications of nonpatentable subject matter, such as laws of nature and mathematical algorithms, were patentable subject matter.52 The Supreme Court's holding in Diehr was
50. Id. at 180-81.
51. Id. at 189 n.12. The majority Diehr opinion attempted to avoid the argument
that Diehr was a reversal of Flook:
It is argued that the procedure of dissecting a claim into old and new elements is mandated by our decision in Flook which noted that a mathematical
algorithm must be assumed to be within the "prior art." It is from this language that the [Government] premises its argument that if everything other
than the algorithm is determined to be old in the art, then the claim cannot
recite statutory subject matter. The fallacy in this argument is that we did
not hold in Flook that the mathematical algorithm could not be considered at
all when making the § 101 determination. To accept the analysis proffered by
the [Government] would, if carried to its extreme, make all inventions unpatentable because all inventions can be reduced to underlying principles of nature which, once known, make their implementation obvious. The analysis
suggested by the Government would also undermine our earlier decisions regarding the criteria to consider in determining the eligibility of a process for
patent protection.
Id. at 189.
52. The Diehr Court stated the following:
Our earlier opinions lend support to our present conclusion that a claim
drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory
simply because it uses a mathematical formula, computer program or digital
computer. In Gottschalk v. Benson we noted, "It is said that the decision precludes a patent for any program, servicing a computer. We do not so hold."
409 US at 71. Similarly, in Parker v. Flook we stated that "a process is not
unpatentable simply because it contains a law of nature or a mathematical
algorithm." 437 U.S. at 590. It is now commonplace that an application of a
law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may
well be deserving of patent protection. (Citations omitted, emphasis in
original.)
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consistent with the Freeman-Walter test. Although the FreemanWalter test is arguably narrower than Diehr's application test for
determining where subject matter is patentable, it is not inconsistent with Diehr. Under Diehr, an application of a method of calculation "to subject matter otherwise statutory" qualifies an invention as
patentable subject matter. In the context of section 101, a "process"
or "machine" which utilizes a method of calculation in an application is patentable subject matter per se. The determination of the
boundary line between a patentable application of a mathematical
algorithm and an unpatentable method of calculation involving the
mathematical algorithm is determined from the consideration of the
claim "as a whole. 53a While claim analysis is complicated, experienced patent practioners routinely analyze claims for compliance
with sections 102, 103, and 112 of the Patent Code and thus, should
not have great difficulty in applying the Diehr test. In the final analysis, the real difference between the Flook and Diehr inventions was
in the claimed subject matter54 The Supreme Court did not consider Flook's updated alarm limit to be an application (a debatable
point) of the calculation of the Arrhenius equation. Diehr's process
As Mr. Justice Stone explained four decades ago:
While a scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is not a patentable invention, a novel and useful structure created with the aid of
knowledge of scientific truth may be. Mackay Radio Corp. & Telegraph
Co. v. Radio Corp. ofAmerica, 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939).
We think this statement in Mackay takes us a long way toward the
correct answer in this case. Arrhenius' equation is not patentable in isolation, but when a process for curing rubber is devised which incorporates in it a more efficient solution of the equation, that process is at the
very least not barred at the threshold by § 101.
In determining the eligibility of respondent's claimed process for patent protection under § 101, their claims must be considered as a whole. It
is inappropriateto dissect the claims into old and new elements and then
to ignore the presence of the old elements in the analysis. This is particularly true in a process claim because a new combination of steps in a process may be patentable even though all the constituents of the
combination were well known and in common use before the combination was made. The "novelty" of any element or steps in a process, or even
of the process itself, is of no relevance in determining whether the subject
matter of a claim falls within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable
subject matter.
450 U.S. at 187-89 (emphasis added).
53. This statement effectively overrules the Flook test which required the bifurcation of the claims into algorithmic and nonalgorithmic parts.
54. 450 U.S. 175, 210 n.32 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Indeed, the most significant distinction between the invention at issue in Flook and that at issue in this
case lies not in the characteristics of the inventions themselves, but rather in the
drafting of the claims.").
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was viewed as a rubber curing process which had always been a
statutory process regardless of the process steps used to practice it.
The Diehr decision has significantly clarified the law in several
areas:
1. The proper test for determining the patentability of programming requires analysis of the claims "as a whole." The USPTO
interpretation of Flook, which required dissection of the claims into
algorithmic and nonalgorithmic parts, was overruled.
2. Applications of methods of calculation involving mathematical algorithms are patentable subject matter.
3. Methods of calculation of mathematical algorithms alone or
limited to fields of use are not patentable subject matter.
4. Token post-solution activity does not transform an unpatentable method of calculation involving a mathematical algorithm into
55
patentable subject matter.
5. Diehr did not decide the issue of the patentability of programming involving nonmathematical algorithms. Diehr did not
state any dicta inconsistent with nonmathematical applications of
programming being patentable subject matter. The patentability of
programming which does not involve mathematical algorithms has
been significantly effected by new USPTO guidelines which will be
discussed below.
III.

THE USPTO RESPONSE TO DIEHR

The USPTO promulgated guidelines 56 to implement the Diehr
decision which for the first time in its history voiced an administrative policy in favor of patents on most types of programs. Most of
the guidelines define the lines of demarcation between unpatentable
methods of calculation and patentable applications of methods of
calculation by direct quotation from the salient parts of Diehr. The
guidelines further conclude that "[t] he Court's requirement that the
'claims must be considered as a whole' in effect leaves viable the
CCPA's two step procedure set forth in In re Freeman and In re
Walter. 57
What is truly significant about the USPTO guidelines is that
they instruct the USPTO examining corps that computer programs
which do not involve mathematical algorithms, are patentable subject matter if they otherwise do not involve other nonstatutory sub55. 450 U.S. at 192 n.14.
56. MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, SECTION 2110: PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATrER-MATHEMAICAL ALGORITHMS OR COMPUTER PROGRAMS 538-38.3 (October

1981) [hereinafter cited as USPTO Guidelines].
57. Id.
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ject matter.58
In accordance with the two-step procedure outlined above, claims
seeking coverage for a computer program would be non-statutory
under 35 U.S.C. § 101, only if, when considered as a whole, they
merely recite a mathematical algorithm, or a method of calculation.
Such an approach is the same as that contemplated for apparatus
claims by the CCPA in In re Bradley and Franklin.... 59
Thus, programming which does not involve mathematical algorithms
or methods of calculation is now considered to be patentable subject
matter.
Given the longstanding opposition of the USPTO to patents on
software, it is truly remarkable that the agency voluntarily changed
its position on the patentability of software in areas not dictated by
Diehr. There was nothing in the Diehr holding which mandated
USPTO change of its policy against patents on programming outside
the patentability of applications of mathematical algorithms. In effect, the USPTO unilaterally and significantly changed the law
where Congress refused to legislate throughout the 1970's.60
IV.

CCPA RESPONSES TO DIEHR

The CCPA interpretation of the Diehr decision is revealed by its
recent decisions in In re Taner,6 1 In re Pardo,62In re Abele, 63 and In
re Meyer.6

A.

IN RE ABELE

In Abele, the CCPA broadened its Freeman-Walter test to be
consistent with the "applications" standard set forth in Diehr. The
invention was a computerized axial tomography which is known by
the acronym CAT scan. Abele discovered that a useful CAT scan
could be obtained while subjecting the patient to a lower level of xray exposure. A weighting function was used in otherwise conventional CAT scan calculations to eliminate "artifacts."
58. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office has always held that certain types of
subject matter other than programming are not patentable subject matter. For example, printed matter and methods of doing business are considered unpatentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
59. USPTO Guidelines, supra note 56, at 538.2.
60. In Flook, the Supreme Court stated that Congress has yet to decide the
"[d]ifficult questions of policy concerning the kinds of programs that may be appropriate for patent protection and the form and duration of such protection." 437 U.S. at
595.
61. In re Taner, 681 F.2d 787 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
62. In re Pardo, No. 81-619 (C.C.P.A. Aug. 5, 1982).
63. In re Abele, No. 81-618 (C.C.P.A. Aug. 5, 1982).
64. In re Meyer, No. 82-510 (C.C.P-A Sept. 16, 1982).
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The USPTO Board of Appeals relied upon the Freeman-Walter
test to sustain the Examiner's rejection of the claimed invention as
not being patentable subject matter.
When the claims are analyzed in (the manner dictated by Walter),
it is manifest that the mathematical algorithm is not implemented
in a manner to define structural relationships between physical elements in the apparatus claims or to refine or limit claim steps in the
process claims. The claims do no more than present and solve a
65
mathematical algorithm and are manifestly nonstatutory.
In its decision in Abele, the CCPA broadened its Freeman-Walter test to the "applications" test of Diehr as the standard for determining the patentability of subject matter involving mathematical
algorithms:
[T] he Walter analysis ... does not limit patentable subject matter
only to claims in which structural relationships or process steps are
defined, limited or refined by the application of the algorithm.
Rather, Walter should be read as requiring no more than that
the algorithm be "applied in any manner to physical elements or
process steps," provided that its application is circumscribed by
more than afield of use limitation or non-essentialpost-solution activity. Thus, if the claim would be "otherwise statutory," id., albeit
inoperative or less useful without the algorithm, the claim likewise
presents statutory subject matter when the algorithm is included.
This broad reading of Walter, we conclude, is in accord with the
66
Supreme Court decisions.
Under A bele, then, programs involving mathematical algorithms
are patentable subject matter unless the claimed invention
preempts the algorithm, is a method of calculation limited only to a
field of use or is a method of calculation involving nonessential post67
solution activity.
The application of these principles is illustrated by the CCPA's
treatment of Abele's claims, only some of which the court found eligible for patent protection. Claims five and six are representative:
5. A method of displaying data in a field comprising the steps of
calculating the difference between the local value of the data at a
data point in the field and the average value of the data in a region
of the field which surrounds said point for each point in said field,
and displaying the value of said difference as a signed gray scale at
a point in a picture which corresponds to said data point.
6. The method of claim 5 wherein said date is x-ray attenuation
65. Quoted in Abele, 684 F.2d at 905.
66. Id. at 906 (emphasis added).
67. Presumably, "non-essential post-solution activity" involves subject matter
such as the updating of the alarm limit in Flook. Precise delineation of the metes
and bounds of "non-essential post-solution activity" will await further decision.
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data produced in a two dimensional field by a computed tomogra68
phy scanner.
Claim five was found to present "no more than the calculation of
69
a number and display of the result, albeit in a particular format."
It was "directed solely to the mathematical algorithm portion of appellants invention and is, thus, not statutory subject matter under
''
§ 101. 70
In contrast, the method of claim six required "X-ray attenuation
data," a difference the court found significant:
The specification indicated that such attenuation data is available
only when an x-ray beam is produced by a CAT scanner, passed
through an object, and detected upon its exit. Only after these
steps have been completed is the algorithm performed, and the re71
sultant modified data displayed in the required format.
The CCPA recognized that the Freeman-Walter test requirement of
refinement or limitation of the earlier claim steps was not present in
claim six. Use of the applications test of Diehr, however, which focuses on the claimed process as a whole for determination if otherwise statutory subject matter is present, resulted in the following
finding:
[PJroduction, detection, and display steps ...
[are] manifestly
statutory subject matter ....
What appellants have done is to discover an application of an algorithm to process steps which are
themselves part of an overall process which is statutory. Hence,
claim six cannot be construed as a mere procedure for solving a
72
given mathematical problem.

B.

IN RE PARDO

Pardo73 involved a compiler program for executing program
steps out of the order in which they were presented. The Pardo decision is important because it involved programming subject matter
which does not involve mathematical algorithms. Claim thirty is
representative of the subject matter sought to be patented:
30. A process of operating a general purpose data processor of
known type to enable the data processor to execute formulas in an
object program comprising a plurality of formulas, such that the
same results will be produced when using the same given data, re68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

684 F.2d at 908.
Id. at 909.
Id. at 908-09.
Id.
Id. at 909 (emphasis in original).
In re Pardo, 684 F.2d 912 (C.C.P-A. 1982).
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gardless of the sequence in which said formulas are presented in
said object program, comprising the steps of:
(a) examining each of said formulas in a storage area of the
data processor to determine which formulas can be designated as
defined,
(b) executing, in the sequence in which each formula is designated as defined, said formulas designated as defined;
(c) repeating steps (a) and (b) for at least undefined formulas
as many times as required until all said formulas have been designated as defined and have been executed;
whereby to produce the same results upon execution of the formulas in the sequence recited in step (b) when using the same
given data, regardless of the order in which said formulas were
74
presented in the object program prior to said process.
The USPTO Examiner acknowledged that the algorithm was not
mathematical.
The CCPA rejected the USPTO solicitor's argument that the
"claims indirectly amount to mathematical calculations, because the
programs [disclosed in the patent application] subjected to appellants' process are exemplified as mathematical formulae.17 5 The
CCPA reiterated the broad scope of section 101, which is to be limited only by judicial exceptions:
"[A] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not
become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical
formula, computer program, or digital computer." Diamond v.
Diehr, supra at 187.....
.Indeed, any process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter constitutes statutory subject matter
unless it falls within a judicially determined exception to section
101 .... The appealed claims do not fall within any such
76
exception.
C.

IN RE MEYER

In Meyer,77 the invention was a computer program for analyzing
the response of a complex system, such as the human nervous system, to a series of tests. The program predicted the probability of
function or malfunction of the elements in the system being tested.
The invention in essence implemented the analysis function of a
neurologist in a computer program. 78 The CCPA held that the
74. Id. at 913.
75. Id. at 916 (emphasis in original).
76. Id. (emphasis in original).
77. In re Meyer, 688 F.2d 789 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
78. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Solicitor characterized the invention as
a "diagnostic" or "memory" aid for a physician and emphasized that the invention
does not conduct a diagnosis in and of itself, but is used by a doctor when performing
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claimed invention 79 was in essence a mathematical algorithm of a
mental process, which is not patentable subject matter. The meaning of the term "mathematical algorithm" was discussed in detail:
Scientific principles, such as the relationship between mass and
energy, and laws of nature, such as the acceleration of gravity,
namely, a = 32 ft./sec. 2, can be represented in mathematical format.
However, some mathematical algorithms and formulae do not represent scientific principles or laws of nature; they represent ideas or
mental processes and are simply logical vehicles for communicating
possible solutions to complex problems. The presence of a mathematical algorithm or formula in a claim is merely an indication that
a scientific principle, law of nature, idea or mental process may be
the subject matter claimed and, thus, justify a rejection of that
claim under 35 U.S.C. § 101; but the presence of a mathematical al80
gorithm or formula is only a signpost for further analysis.
The CCPA's characterization of mathematical algorithms as
"simply logical vehicles for communicating possible solutions to
complex problems" delineates those subject areas of programming
which may be judicially excepted from being patentable subject
matter under section 101.
a diagnosis to store and to accumulate test responses obtained by this standard process of elimination and to narrow the neurological area of possible malfunction. In
fact, the Solicitor indicated that these standard tests have been employed for many
years and that the more experienced the doctor and the better his memory, the less
would be his need (if any) for this invention. Id.
79. Claim one is representative of the invention sought to be patented.
1. A process for identifying [sic] locations of probable malfunction in a
complex system, said process comprising the steps of:
(a) selecting a plurality of elements in the complex system, said elements having known locations;
(b) initializing a factor associated with each of said elements;
(c) testing the complex system for a response, which response, if
effective, requires proper functioning of certain said elements, the probable identity [sic] of at least some of these certain elements being
known;
(d) determining whether said response of the complex system was
at least partially effective or ineffective;
(e) modifying the factor associated with at least some of said elements known to be possible [sic] involved in the response in accordance
with the effectiveness of the response; and
(f) repeating steps (c), (d) and (e) for further responses of the
complex system to obtain resultant factors for at least some of said
elements,
whereby said resultant factors are indicative of probable malfunction
of their associated elements and thereby indicative of probable malfunction at the locations of these elements.
Id. at 792-93.
80. Id. at 794-95 (emphasis in original).
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D. IN RE TANER
The applicant in Taner8 l sought patent protection for a method
of seismic exploration in which spherical seismic waves are used
during exploration to simulate the earth's reponse to plane or cylindrical waves. The claimed invention8 2 utilizes a mathematical al-

gorithm implemented on a digital computer which sums reflection
signals of the spherical waves.
The USPTO Board of Appeals held that Christensen8 3 was controlling for the reason that the claimed invention was a method of
calculation with the antecedent stops merely serving to supply the
required data for solving the mathematical algorithm. Under Christensen and Richman,84 the presence of data gathering steps in the
claims was not considered sufficient to convert claims involving a
method of calculation utilizing a mathematical algorithm into a patentable process.
The CCPA viewed the claimed signal as a physical conversion of
the spherical seismic signals. It reasoned that the expression of
physical apparitions (the claimed signals) in mathematical terms
was irrelevant in controlling the patentability protection. 85 The
CCPA expressly overruled Christensen to the extent that it conflicted with the applications test of Diehr:
[W]hen a claim containing a mathematical formula implements or
applies that formula in a structure or process, which, when considered as a whole, is performing a function which the patent laws
were designed to protect (e.g., transforming or reducing an article
81. In re Taner, 681 F.2d 787 (C.C.PA 1982).
82. Claim one is representative of the claimed invention:
1. A method of seismic exploration by simulating from substantially
spherical seismic waves the reflection response of the earth to seismic energy
having a substantially continuous wavefront over an extent of an area being
explored having at least one dimension which is large relative to a seismic
wavelength, comprising the steps of:
(a) imparting the spherical seismic energy waves into the earth
from a seismic source at a source position;
(b) generating a plurality of reflection signals in response to the
seismic energy waves at a set of receiver positions spaced in an array
over an extent having at least one dimension which is large relative to a
seismic wave length; and
(c) summing the reflection signals to form for the source position a
signal simulating the reflection response of the earth to seismic energy
having a substantially continuous wavefront over at least one dimension
which is large relative to a seismic energy wavelength.
Id. at 788.
83. In re Christensen, 478 F.2d 1392 (C.C.P.A.1973).
84. In re Richman, 563 F.2d 1026 (C.C.PA 1977).
85. The characterization of the signals as physical apparitions was supported by
In re Sherwood, 613 F.2d 809 (C.C.PA 1980) and In re Johnson, 589 F.2d 1070
(C.C.PA 1978).
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to a different state or thing), then the claim satisfies the requirements of § 101 ....
Accordingly, to the extent
that it conflicts with
86
what we say here, Christensen is overruled.
In other words, the recitation of antecedent data gathering steps can
be a sufficient basis to constitute a patentable application of a nonpatentable mathematical algorithm.
V.

TYPES OF PATENTABLE PROGRAMMING

In the last two and one-half years, the Supreme Court in Diehr,
the CCPA in Abele, Pardo,Meyer and Taner, and the USPTO have
each decisively acted to expand the types of programming which are
patentable subject matter. The effect of these actions is that for the
first time many areas of programming are clearly patentable subject
matter. The previous uncertainty about patentability has been removed for most types of programming.
There are two main categories of computer programs: system
programs and application programs. A system program is used to
manage or control the operation of a computing system to facilitate
its use by the user. Most system programs are "transparent" to the
user in that the user normally does not write the program for a specific use. An application program performs a specified task in accordance with a user's program, and its content is under the control
of the user. Common examples of system programs include:
(1) Operating Systems-or supervisory executive programs which
control and allocate the computer resources of main memory and
input and output peripheral devices and the execution of programs;
(2) Assembler Programs-programs which prepare machine language programs from symbolic (human intelligible) programming
language programs. Assembler programs usually translate one
source code program statement to one machine language instruction. These are known as low level languages.
(3) Compiler Programs-programs that prepare machine language
programs from source programs written in a higher level programming language. A compiler program usually translates one source
code program statement into more than one machine language instruction. These are known as higher level languages. The compiler program may include or perform the functions of an assembler
87
program also.
Applications programs span a wide field, but for purposes of determination of patentable subject matter, they may be catagorized
as (1) programs which implement mathematical algorithms, or
86. 681 F.2d at 791 (citation omitted).
87. See Prasinos, Legal Protection of Software Via Copyright, 8 APLA Q.J. 252,
255 (1980).
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(2) programs which do not implement mathematical algorithms.
The patentability of applications programs involving mathematical
algorithms is determined by the precedent and USPTO guidelines
discussed earlier. While the issue of patentability was not before
the court, Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co.,88
involved a dispute over a structural analysis program which was essentially a method of calculation involving various mathematical algorithms. The Synercom program was found not to be patentable
89
subject matter.
The USPTO guidelines, which permit patents on programming
involving nonmathematical algorithms, will increase the number of
patents issued on nonscientific applications of programming. Once
it becomes generally understood that patents on nonmathematical
applications of software can be obtained, patent protection will be
widely considered as an additional protection mechanism in any
plan for maximum security of software. The way in which patents,
copyrights and trade secrets affect the protection of programming is
discussed later.
The patentability of systems programs was firmly established
by the CCPA in In re Bradley.90 The invention in Bradley related to
the altering or repositioning of information in a system base of a
computer. The invention implemented the manipulation of information by means of a program stored on a "firmware" module such as a
ROM. The USPTO Board of Appeals reasoned that the theoretical
mathematical operations of a computer made systems programs
unpatentable:
In whatever form the instructions employed in appellants' invention are characterized, numerical or otherwise, we think it is accurate to say that the operation of appellants' structure is
mathematical and that the instructions constitute a procedure
which is algorithmic in character ... within the definition of algorithm supplied in Benson and reiterated in Flook.9 1
Applying the Freeman test discussed earlier, the CCPA rejected the
Board of Appeals reasoningWhen we examine appellants' invention as a whole under the first
88. Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003
(1978).
89. Examples of applications programs which do not involve methods of calculation utilizing mathematical algorithms are Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith's
Securities Brokerage-Case Management Systems, which is disclosed in U.S. Patent
No. 4,346,442, and Frederic C. Tower's Securities Valuation System, which is disclosed
in U.S. Patent No. 4,344,270.
90. In re Bradley, 600 F.2d 807 (1979), affd per curiam by an equally divided
court, 209 U.S.P.Q. 97 (1981).
91. 600 F.2d at 811.
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step of this test, including the information microprogrammed into
the firmware element as depicted in Figs. 14(a-i) and 15(b-c), we
fail to detect the presence of any mathematical algorithm. In altering information in the system base as desired, certain "calculations" are made, such as determining whether a given quantity is
equal to zero, or, as noted by the solicitor, multiplying an address in
memory by sixteen to arrive at another address. However, it certainly cannot be said that comparing with92zero or multiplying by
sixteen is preempted by appellant's claims.
The same result is reached by applying the newer Abele test since
no mathematical algorithm is present.
The very nature of a system program-regardless of its specific
function--does not involve mathematical algorithms as that term
has been defined in the relevant decisions. In some way a system
program modifies or controls the operation of computer hardware
which is manifestly patentable subject matter under section 101 as
construed by Diehr. Properly drafted patent claims to any system
program will recite hardware that is manipulated by the program
without the application of a mathematical algorithm and, afortiori,
will involve "subject matter otherwise statutory" as described in
Diehr.93 The claims in patent applications on systems programs
should not even reach the threshold question of the Freeman-Walter-Abele tests of whether a mathematical algorithm is present.
Thus, systems programs are patentable subject matter per se.
VI. PROSPECT FOR CHANGE IN THE LAW OF
PROGRAMMING PATENTABIITY
A number of factors militate against substantial change in the
law of programming patentability in the immediate future. First, the
new CAFC has exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over appeals
arising under the patent laws because of refusal of the USPTO to
grant a patent on a pending application (formerly the CCPA's jurisdiction). In addition, the CAFC now has subject matter jurisdiction
of all patent appeals arising from infringement actions in the federal
district courts. The precedents of the CCPA for judging the patentability of programming will be fully controlling in all future actions of
the CAFC. Second, the prospect of change in CAFC rulings on the
patentability of programming is low because prior CCPA precedent
which is now well-developed will be applied to all patent appeals.
There is little likelihood of divergent opinions on the patentability of
programming since all appeals on the subject will be processed
92. Id. at 813.
93. See supra text accompanying notes 50-53.

COMPUTER/LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. I"V

through the CAFC. There are no appeals involving the patentability
of programming presently pending before the CAFC. Third, new
USPTO guidelines which bar the rejection of most forms of programming greatly diminish the likelihood of appeals from the
USPTO to the CAFC. USPTO pressure on patent examiners to examine large numbers of patent applications is a strong deterrent to
the rejection of applications for failure to claim patentable subject
matter.94 Fewer rejections of applications for containing unpatentable programming necessarily will result in fewer appeals to the
CAFC which in turn will create less pressure toward change in the
law. It is also known that the Department of Justice has lost interest in seeking further certioraripetitions in an attempt to "clarify"
the law as was the case with Diehr. Finally, Congressional action
changing the scope of programming which is patentable subject
matter is unlikely given the extreme political pressure which would
be incident to any legislative proposals to change the status quo. In
the past, Congress has refused to take action even though the
Supreme Court has suggested that legislation was warranted to re95
solve the patentability of programming.
VII.

COPYRIGHT PROTECTION OF PROGRAMMING
A.

SUBJECT MATTER

A review of the component steps of the programming process is
helpful in examining the scope of protection afforded to programming by copyrights. The typical program begins as an "idea" in the
mind of the programmer, is next reduced to a flow chart which sets
forth the basic algorithm of the program, and which finally is reduced to program by coding the algorithm in a computer language.
The coding process is the point in the formulation of a program at
which copyright protection may be obtained.
Section 102(b) of the Copyright Act 96 clearly establishes the
principle, well-established by prior case law,97 that a copyright cov94. To maintain a satisfactory performance rating, the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office Examiners are required to examine a "quota" of patent applications. Failure to
achieve at least 90% of the quota is a basis for an unsatisfactory rating which depending on circumstances can lead to disciplinary action such as down grading on the civil
service scale or dismissal. The net effect of the quota system is that patent examiners are discouraged from rejecting applications for failure to claim patentable subject
matter under § 101 because these cases traditionally require extra time to complete
examination due to the greater likelihood of appeals.
95. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 73 (1972) ("considerable problems are
raised which only committees of Congress can manage").
96. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982).
97. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
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ers the author's expression of an idea, but not the underlying idea
itself: "In no case does copyright protection for an original work of
authorship extend to any ideas, procedure, process, system, method
of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form
in which it is described, explained, illustrated or embodied in such
work. ' 98 The algorithm represents the "concept" of the program,
and no copyright protection may adhere to it. The actual coding, regardless of its form of recording, i.e., a piece of paper or magnetic
tape, satisfies the further statutory requirement that copyrightable
subject matter must be "fixed in any tangible medium of
expression." 99

B. RIGHTS PROTECTED By COPYRIGHT
The rights conferred by copyright which are applicable to programs are:
1. To reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or
phonorecords.
2. To prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted
work.
3. To distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted
work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership or
by lease or lending .... 100
A copyright on a program provides protection against unauthorized copying of all or a significant part of the program (derivative
work) as well as unauthorized distribution of copies. A copyright
does not proscribe the independent derivation of a similar program
even when the underlying algorithm embodied in the copyrighted
program, as distinguished from the program itself, is used as a reference for developing a program. A copyright cannot prevent "reverse
engineering" of a program to derive its underlying algorithm which
is used as a reference for independent derivation of new coding embodying the algorithm. Thus, exclusive reliance on copyright to protect programming will not provide sufficient statutory protection
where the underlying algorithm is sufficiently novel and unobvious
to warrant patent protection. 10 1
98. See supra note 96.
99. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
100. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982).
101. Patent protection is not limited to protection of the underlying algorithm for
the reason that protection of narrow scope is possible on programs per se when
proper claim format is used. Most attempts to patent programming are and will be
limited to attempts to cover the underlying algorithm. This rationale is sound for the
reason that any patent having claims which recite in substance individual program
steps or their equivalents would be of such narrow scope as to be practically worth-
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PROTECTION OF PROGRAMS EMBODIED IN OBJECT CODE

The literal explosion of microprocessor applications has had the
effect of increasing investment in programming which is implemented in read only memories (ROMs) and other types of hardware
memories used to control microprocessors. Today's technology permits exact duplication of a program which is stored in a ROM or
equivalent memory device by the making of identical copies of the
original ROM. This facilitates piracy of arcade-type games such as
"PAC MAN." An exact copy of a control ROM for a particular
arcade game can be used to convert any other arcade game into a
duplicate of the particular arcade game without involving great expense or substantial time. The use of copyrights to protect object
code embodied in storage media such as ROM's presents a unique
challenge to the adaptability of the copyright law to new technologies. Under section 102(b) of the Copyright Act, the "method of operation" is outside the scope of copyright protection. To the extent
that it can be effectively argued that object code is primarily a manifestation of a method of operation of a device, copyright protection
will be ineffective.
The courts have not reached a consensus on whether a copyright on a source code includes its implementation as object code in
a ROM or other similar device; the trend of decisions, however, appears to have shifted toward protection of the object code. The first
case on the issue, Data Cash Systems v. J.S.G.A. Group, Inc.,102 held
that object code in a ROM was not covered by a copyright on the
source code. The court reasoned that "since the ROM is not in a
form which one can 'see and read' with the naked eye, it is not a
'copy' within the meaning of the 1909 Act. In its object phase, the
ROM, the computer program is a mechanical tool or a machine part
but it is not a 'copy' of the source program."' 0 3 The conclusion of
the Data Cash court conflicts with the section 101 definition of a
"copy" and was recently specifically rejected by Williams Electronics, Inc. v. Artis International,Inc..1o4 In Williams Electronics, object code stored in a ROM was held to be protected by a copyright
less. Under the law of patent infringement, a process is not literally infringed if any
step is omitted from the accused infringing process.
For a discussion of dual copyright-patent protection, see infra text accompanying
notes 117-21.
102. 480 F. Supp. 1063 (1979). This case was decided under the old copyright law
but the court made it clear in dicta that it believed that the 1976 Copyright Act, if applicable, would yield the same result. Id. at 1066 n.4.
103. Id. at 1069.
104. 24 P.T.CJ. 387 (1982).
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on the source code.105 This case involved piracy of an arcade game.
The defendant argued that a "distinction must be drawn between
the 'source code' version of a computer program, which can be copyrighted, and the 'object code' stage which it argued cannot be protected" for the reason that "a computer program stored in a ROM
does not satisfy the statutory requirement of being fixed in a material object because a 'copy' must be intelligible to human beings and
must be intended as a medium of communication to human beings."'1 6 The Third Circuit, however, rejected the defendant's
argument:
The answer to defendant's contention is in the words of the statute
itself. A 'copy' is defined to include a material object in which a
work is fixed 'by any method now known or later developed, and
from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.' 17 U.S.C. § 101.... By this broad language Congress opted
for an expansive interpretation of the terms 'fixation' and 'copy'
which encompass technological advances such as those represented
by the electronic devices in this case. We reject any contention that
this broad language should nonetheless be interpreted in a manner
which would severely limit the copyright ability of computer programs which Congress clearly intended to protect. We cannot accept defendant's suggestion that would afford an unlimited loophole
by which infringement of a computer program is limited to copying
of the computer program text but not to duplication of a computer
program fixed on a silicon chip. This was also the conclusion
. . alreached in Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc.,.
10 7
beit in the context of computers rather than video games.
The Court also distinguished Data Cash by arguing that the Seventh Circuit affirmance was on other grounds.
In GCA Corp. v. Chance,10 8 the court sustained the plaintiffs argument that object code stored in a ROM is covered by a copyright
on the source code. The court reasoned "[blecause the object code
is the description of the copyrighted source code, the two are to be
treated as one work; therefore copyright of the source code protects
the object code as well."'1 9 Another court, however, has viewed the
issue of coverage of object code stored in a ROM by a copyright on
the source code to be unsettled. In Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id. at 388.
Id.
Id.
24 P.T.CJ. 574 (1982).

109. Id. at 575.
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Computer Corp.,110 the court refused to grant a preliminary injunction for the reason that "[o pinion has been divided on how to treat
object codes, and on how to treat ROMs generally." '' The effectiveness of copyright protection will be substantially weakened if the
courts do not adopt the rule set forth by the Third Circuit in Williams Electronics. A contrary result will substantially enhance
piracy, especially in the area of arcade games and similar devices
which are easily reverse engineered by copying the control ROM.
The deterrent effect of copyrights on the development of competing software depends to a large extent upon the effort required to
produce the program. 112 The protection provided by copyright on a
program will be small where the development effort of the coding is
a small part of the overall development. Copyright protection will
be greater where the development effort of the coding is a large part
of the overall development effort. Furthermore, the permissible
copying of an algorithm to develop competitive coding can eliminate
a large part of a competitor's effort to duplicate a program.
Copyright has several advantages over patent protection. There
is no examination of copyrights. The expense of obtaining registra3
tion is low. A work is eligible for copyright so long as it is original"
and contains a minimum of intellectual labor." 4 Courts traditionally will grant preliminary injunctions to stop violation of copyrights. It is almost impossible to obtain an injunction prior to final
judgment in a patent infringement action. While it is impossible to
quantify the minimum intellectual effort required to make a program copyrightable, programs involving more than a few steps
should not be subject to challenge as uncopyrightable subject
matter.
VIII. TRADE SECRETS
The protection of programming by trade secrets is effectuated
by the application of state law. Variation from state to state in the
110. 25 P.T.CJ. 388-89 (1982). Presumably, the court may have reached a different
result if it were aware of the Williams Electronics case. See supra note 104.
111. 25 P.T.CJ. at 389.
112. See Keplinger, Computer Software-Its Nature and Its Protection, 30 EMORY

L. J. 483 (1981).
113. Under the copyright law, any number of copyrights may be registered on the
same work so long as the works to be registered are original to their respective authors. The patent law, on the other hand, only permits the first inventor of an invention to obtain a patent. This is the so-called "novelty" criteria under § 102.
114. See, e.g., Cash Dividend Check Corp. v. Davis, 247 F.2d 458 (9th Cir. 1957);
Brown Instrument Co. v. Warner, 161 F.2d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1947); and Taylor Instrument
Co. v. Fawley-Brost Co., 139 F.2d 98 (7th Cir. 1943).
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enforcement of trade secrets involving programming is, therefore,
likely to occur. Twenty-five states and all federal jurisdictions have
substantially adopted the definition of trade secrets as contained in
section 757 of the Restatement of Torts, comment b:
[a] ny formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which
is used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it. The
subject matter of a trade secret must be . . . secret so that, except
by the use of improper means, there would be difficulty in acquiring
the information. An exact definition of a trade secret is not possible. Some factors to be considered in determining whether given
information is one's trade secret are: (1) the extent to which the information is known outside of his business; (2) the extent to which
it is known by employees and others involved in his business;
(3) the extent of measures taken by him to guard the secrecy of the
information; (4) the value of the information to him and to his competitors; (5) the amount of effort or money expended by him in dethe
veloping the information; (6) the ease or difficulty with which 115
information could be properly acquired or duplicated by others.
The key element in maintaining a trade secret is to prevent it
from becoming general knowledge. Many factors can cause a trade
secret to become unprotectable because of loss of secrecy. Reverse
engineering of the trade secret is permissible. Thus, computer programs which are not lawfully protected by patent and copyright are
fair game for reverse engineering or copying if they were lawfully
obtained. The reverse engineering of an unprotected ROM would be
a classic example of a lawfully obtained trade secret. Widespread licensing of trade secrets, under conditions of confidence to a large
percentage of potentially interested persons could vitiate the trade
secret. This theory of trade secret law was discussed in the Final
Report of the National Commission on New Technological Use of
16
Copyrighted Works.
IX.

PATENT-COPYRIGHT INTERFACE

There is no conflict between utility patent and copyright protection on programming. In In re Yardley, 117 the CCPA held that the
USPTO rejection of a design patent application was improper because there was no statutory estoppel consequent from the obtaining of copyrights on the "Spiro Agnew" wristwatch. The CCPA
reasoned that Congress has manifested its intention to create two
§ 757 comment b (1939).

115.

RESTATEMENT OF TORTS

116.

NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS,

FINAL REPORT

17 (July 31, 1978).

117. 493 F.2d 1389 (C.C.P.A. 1974).

COMPUTER/LAW JOURNAL
distinct statutory rights with potentially overlapping
coverage:

[Vol. IV
areas of

We believe that the 'election of protection' doctrine is in direct conflict with the clear intent of Congress manifested in the two statutory provisions quoted above. The Congress has provided that
subject matter of the type involved in this appeal is 'statutory subject matter' under the copyright statute and is 'statutory subject
matter' under the design patent statute, but the Congress has not
provided that an author-inventor must elect between securing a
copyright or securing a design patent. Therefore, we conclude that
it would be contrary to the intent of Congress to hold that an author-inventor must elect between the two available modes of secur1 18
ing exclusive rights.

The CCPA's rationale that there is no conflict between design
patents and copyrights is equally applicable to the potential overlap
between copyrights and utility patents.1 1 9 The same two constitionally-based 120 statutes are involved in a utility patent-copyright interface as was present in Yardley. Moreover, the distinction between
the protection conferred by utility patent and copyright is clearly
recognized in section 102 of the copyright law where protection of
the underlying "idea" is clearly barred. Patent coverage on programming clearly covers the underlying algorithm whereas copyright protection on programming covers only the author's coding.
Moreover, subsection (d) section 301 of the copyright law clearly establishes that the copyright law does not affect other federal statutes: "Nothing in this title annuls or limits any rights or remedies
21
under any Federal statute.'
X.

TRADE SECRET-COPYRIGHT INTERFACE

Section 301 of the copyright law establishes federal preemption
of copyright law, and states:
Preemption with respect to other laws (a) On and after January 1,
1978, all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the
exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified
by sections 102 and 103, whether created before or after that date
and whether published or unpublished, are governed exclusively by
this title. Thereafter, no person is entitled to any such right or
equivalent right in any such under the common law or statutes of
any State. (b) Nothing in this title annuls or limits any rights or
118. Id. at 1394.
119. All of the cases heard by the CCPA and Supreme Court have involved attempts to obtain utility patent coverage.
120. Article I, section 8 of the Constitution provides the basis for both the patent
and the copyright laws.
121. 17 U.S.C. § 301(d) (1982).
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remedies under the common law or statutes of any State with respect to(1) subject matter that does not come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103, including
works of authorship not fixed in any tangible medium of expression; or
(2) any cause of action arising from undertakings commenced
before January 1, 1978; or
(3) activities violating legal or equitable rights that are not
equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general
scope of copyright as specified by section 106.122
The possibility of federal preemption of trade secret law by the
copyright law was considered by Congress in the legislative history
of the Computer Software Act of 1980,123 but the courts have yet to
rule on this issue.
In Technicon Medical Information Systems Corp. v. Green Bay
Packaging,Inc. ,124 the Seventh Circuit held that documents bearing
a copyright notice under the Copyright Act of 1909 are not barred
from trade secret protection. The District Court certified the issue
on appeal, under 28 U.S.C. section 1292 as "whether the acts of
(1) affixing to certain documents a statutory notice of copyright...
and (2) publishing the document, estops the party who affixed the
notice and published the documents from subsequently asserting
that such documents have not been generally published as represented by the copyright notice but instead contain subject matter
which is trade secret."'x2 The Seventh Circuit rejected the defendant's argument that the doctrine of statutory estoppel barred trade
secret protection for the reason that no benefit had been conferred
by that publication under the terms of the 1909 Act. An amicus curiae raised the constitutional argument that the Supremacy Clause
of the Constitution precluded state trade secret protection when the
122. Id. § 301.
123. H.R. REP. No. 1307, Pt. I, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 23-24 (1980). The legislative history of the Computer Software Copyright Act of 1980 states:
Section 12 embodies the recommendations of the Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works with respect to clarifying the law of
copyright of computer software. During the course of Committee consideration the question was raised as to whether the bill would restrict remedies
for protection of computer software under state law, especially unfair competition and trade secret laws. The Committee consulted the Copyright Office
for its opinion as to whether section 301 of the 1976 Copyright Act in any way
preempted these and other forms of state law protection for computer
software. On the basis of this advice and advice of its own counsel the Committee concluded that state remedies for protection of computer software are
not limited by this bill.
124. 24 P.T.CJ. 479 (1982).
125. Id. at 479-81.
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election of copyright protection was made by affixation of a copyright notice. The Seventh Circuit did not find any inherent overlap
of legal protection between the federal Copyright Act and state
trade secret law, since trade secrets protect the content or ideas of a
work while copyright protects the form of the work. The court, in
dicta, stated that dual enforcement of rights under copyright and
trade secrets could pose a conflict, but the mere assertion of rights
126
did not.
XL
A.

PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER

The protection of patentable forms of programming should be
governed by several practical considerations. The algorithm must
satisfy the statutory criteria for patentability: novelty under 35
U.S.C. section 102 and unobviousness under 35 U.S.C. section 103.
Thus, a quantum of "inventiveness" is required by the patent law
for programming to be patentable. The mere adaption of an old programming algorithm 127 to a slightly different format is not likely to
be sufficiently unobvious to be patentable. The projected useful
commercial life of the algorithm should be at least two or more
years. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office application backlogs make
it virtually impossible to obtain a patent in less than two years, and
the pendancy of a patent application does not provide any statutory
right to exclude practice of an invention before the patent is issued.
The value of the programming should be sufficient to support
the expense of patenting. With the new fee legislation that became
effective October 1, 1982, which included the provision of patent
maintenance fees, the cost of filing an application is likely to be at
least $2,000.00 or more considering government and professional
service fees, with approximately another $1,450.00 or $2,900.00 in issue and maintenance fees over the seventeen year life of a patent.
The cost of prosecuting the application before the U.S. Patent and
Trademark office would be additional.
126. Id.
127. Under 37 C.F.R. § 1.56, the patent applicant has a duty to inform the Patent
Examiner of all prior art that a reasonable Examiner would consider "important in
deciding whether to allow the application to issue as a patent." The applicant who
wishes to patent programming should be particularly careful to inform the Examiner
of all prior art of which he knows. The USPTO search facilities do not have a large
body of prior art pertaining to programming. Thus, in order to insure USPTO consideration of the most relevant prior art, which is essential to maintenance of the persumption of validity under 35 U.S.C. § 282 in infringement litigation, the applicant
should undertake a detailed investigation of all related programming known to it and
cite the known programming to the USPTO.
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The protection of an algorithm embodied in programs which are
intended for widespread distribution by either licensing or outright
sale will be difficult or practically impossible under trade secret law.
The only effective protection mechanism for the algorithm would be
by patent protection, since widespread distribution of the program
would destroy any trade secret which resides in the algorithm.
The maximum statutory protection for programs containing patentable algorithms would be by dual patent and copyright protection. The securing of copyright protection, by affixation of notice on
the program is accomplished at no expense. Thus, a valuable program algorithm can be protected by patent to preclude the copying
of its underlying logic, while its programming can be protected by
copyright. If publication is only under conditions of confidence,
trade secret protection may also be maintained. In many situations,
the high cost of developing software and its substantial commercial
value will warrant the seeking of copyright-patent protection as well
as attempts to maintain trade secret protection.
A trade secret claim in the algorithm may be maintained up to
the time that a patent issues. Under 35 U.S.C. section 122, the Commissioner of Patents maintains the secrecy of all applications "unless necessary to carry out the provisions of an act of Congress or in
such special circumstances as may be determined by the Commissioner. '128 Thus, a patent applicant may elect to obtain patent coverage if the scope of patent protection which may be obtained would
adequately protect the algorithm or he may abandon the application
without any publication where the algorithm would be inadequately
protected.
Organizations engaged in the development of programming
should review their employment agreements to determine if the employment relation addresses ownership of the development of patentable software. In view of the widespread belief that software is
not patentable, it is likely that careful consideration of ownership of
patent rights has not been given in many employment agreements
where the primary business of the employee is to write software.
B.

UNPATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER

The use of copyright protection to protect unpatentable programming in the form of source code or object code is well developed. The low expense of securing copyright protection and the
availability of injunctive relief for copyright infringement are distinct advantages of copyright protection. The disadvantage of copy128. 35 U.S.C. § 122 (1976).
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right protection is that there is no infringement where the
underlying algorithm is used to prepare a program intended to accomplish the same result as the copyrighted work. In effect, the
copyright owner dedicates the underlying algorithm to the public if
no other form of legal protection is available. If the program is to be
widely distributed without conditions of confidentiality, there is no
effective mechanism for preventing use of the algorithm.
C.

TRADE SECRET PROTECTION

Trade secret protection is widely used to protect programming.
The trade secret is usually explicitly defined by contractual terms
between the parties which establish conditions of confidence. Covenants not to compete are often used as an additional condition of
maintaining trade secret status. Nevertheless, the use of trade secret protection may be impossible where copyright or patent protection is obtained. Any disclosure of the trade secret by unlimited
publication of a copyright or in a patent specification will destroy
trade secret status to the extent that the trade secret is the same as
that contained in a patent specification or the copyright. In situations where the trade secret differs from the subject matter protected by the copyright or patent, however, there is no possible
conflict between trade secret, patent and copyright protection.
XII.

CONCLUSION

The methods used for protecting programming should be carefully reevaluated in light of the availability of patent protection on
many forms of programming. Depending upon the circumstances,
patent protection on an algorithm may be a valuable new adjunct to
existing methods of protecting programming.

